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Introduction 
During the last two decades, municipalities have experienced increased financial 
pressure hastened by urbanization, demographic changes, technological 
advances and the proliferation of federal and state mandates as well as declining 
intergovernmental revenue.  Local governments, faced with citizen demands to 
do more with less, are continually seeking ways to economize and make more 
efficient their operations.  In the midst of taxpayer revolts, a century-old debate 
regarding the best form of government continues as some municipalities 
consider whether a change in their form of government is able to provide the 
sought efficiencies.  This paper assesses the relative performance of the council-
manager versus the two predominant political models of government in 
Connecticut: Mayor-Council and Selectman forms of government.  All three will 
be assessed in terms of their capability to provide for greater efficiency in 
Connecticut’s municipalities.  To our knowledge, no study of this type has been 
made which includes the comparative performance of the Selectman form of 
government. While this question has been explored in other states and localities, 
there is a dearth of empirical data on Connecticut.   
Connecticut municipalities display widely varying financial performance 
capabilities.  To explain such variation, we consider several plausible 
explanations including 1) form of government, 2) demographic characteristics 
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such as population size and wealth and 3) fiscal factors.  This study draws from 
2005 data collected on Connecticut municipalities by the Connecticut Economic 
Resource Center and uses a statistical model to perform a comparative analysis.  
Financial performance will be primarily measured in terms of  property taxes, 
bond rates, total expenditures and the grand list.  The findings of this study are 
potentially generalizable throughout the New England region with its shared 
history and local government structures. 
Literature Review 
The debate regarding the optimal structure of municipal government has 
been explored in numerous scholarly works dating back to the Progressive era 
when reformers prescribed a new model for good governance (Knott and Miler 
1987, Nalbandian 1991).  Citing the pervasive corruption associated with urban 
political machines governed by the strong-mayor form of government at the turn 
of the 20th century, the reformers set out to separate politics from administration 
and create a form of government based on “neutral competence.” Among the 
reforms, the council-manager provided for an elected city council with a 
professionally trained manager to administer various municipal departments.   
Freed from political constraints and daily pressures of having to pacify various 
political constituencies prevalent in the strong mayor model, the professional 
manager could ideally make decisions based on economy and efficiency.   
The relative merits of both models have been argued at length by their 
proponents.  Embedded in each type of government structure are choices about 
dominant values that are exhibited to varying degrees in all three forms:  
representativeness, nonpartisan technical competence and executive leadership 
(Aronson and Schwartz 1994).  The intrinsic values of the political model called 
upon this form of government as providing for the most responsiveness towards 
citizens, inherently beneficial in a democracy.  Adherents of the strong mayor 
form of government cite its ability to incorporate a variety of demands 
particularly from ethnic groups prevalent in urban centers.  Cost efficiency was a 
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secondary if not remote consideration of these administrations. But neutral 
competence obliges professional managers to contain costs and often gives them 
a freer hand to make policy decisions since they are not beholden to political 
constituencies such as unions, business interests, and racial and ethnic groups. 
Moving beyond the conventional arguments which are presented in a 
dichotomous fashion, .i.e. politics versus administration, Deno and Mehay (1987) 
explore the notion that both manager and mayor forms of government have 
incentives to promote efficiency as both seek to be responsive to the median 
voter.  The manager, hired by the elected council and serving at the pleasure of 
this body, is often expected to provide professional policy advice and run 
operations efficiently.  The manager’s job performance centers on efficiency and 
productivity achievements (Hayes and Chang, 1990).  The mayor, concerned 
with reelection, also must seek to satisfy voters by holding the line on taxes or 
risk being punished at the polls.  However, unlike managers, mayors also are 
subject to countervailing pressures that militate against efficiency, such as 
satisfying various political constituencies which tend to drive government costs.  
The connection between efficiency and structure of government is not 
simply an academic debate.  Encountering the optimal structural arrangement 
for performance has been an ongoing concern of citizens who demand greater 
efficiency from their government.  Home rule municipalities are empowered to 
change their form of government when citizen discontent reaches a critical mass.  
The quest for the optimal form of government is often viewed as a panacea for 
inefficiencies.  Citizens often make informal assessments of how one or another 
form of government will deliver the promised for benefits when initiating charter 
reforms.  The underlying dynamics of municipal reform is outside the scope of 
our inquiry.  However, it should be noted that several Connecticut municipalities 
have recently undergone charter revisions; some moving to the council-manager 
form of government and in the case of the city of Stratford a reversion back from 
the council–manager to the strong mayor form of government.  
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Institutional Performance and Municipalities 
Institutional performance has become a key consideration at all levels of 
government.  With the advent of the Government Performance and Results Act 
in federal government have come trickle down effects to states and localities.  
Devolution has also spurred academic interest in municipalities an often 
overlooked level of government.  One such project, the Government Performance 
Project based at the Maxwell School for Public Affairs provides ratings for state 
and local governments based on five key systems of government management: 
financial, capital management, human resources management, information 
technology management and managing for results.   The results of this study are 
published in an annual scorecard published by Governing magazine and has 
provided the impetus for some municipalities to improve their managerial 
capabilities.  Another example of the popular concern for municipal performance 
is the annual issue rating Connecticut town’s found in Connecticut magazine. 
While there are a number of dimensions along which government 
performance can be measured, a heightened concern for efficiency has taken a 
central place in debate among scholars and practitioners.  The authors examine 
performance in terms of efficiency; carrying out in the least costly manner the 
provision of government services.  Fiscal efficiency as a measure of municipal 
performance has been explored elsewhere.  Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found 
that reform governments lead to lower levels of taxing and spending.  In a study 
examining the differences between city managers and strong mayor cities, 
Stumm and Corrigan found a strong correlation between cities with professional 
managers and lower property taxes and expenditures (1998).  They found that 
cities with professional management achieve measurable efficiencies compared 
to cities without such management.  The authors measured efficiency in terms of 
reduced levels of municipal expenditures and property taxes.  This study seeks 
to expand upon their findings by focusing exclusively on municipalities in 
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Connecticut.  In addition, this study also will examine bond ratings to determine 
which form of government achieved greater overall levels of financial health. 
Structure of Connecticut’s Municipalities 
Connecticut is often referred to as the land of steady habits.  The reference, 
while somewhat pejorative, is telling of much of the inertia and glacial pace of 
change seen in government institutions.  Nowhere is this more marked than at 
the level of municipal government which bears the same contours and structures 
inherited from colonial New England.   This is evidenced by the fact that few 
municipalities employ the council-manager form of government.  Yet, the 
growing realization that tradition may sacrifice a certain degree of efficiency has 
prompted some municipalities to add a managerial position without jettisoning 
the traditional town meeting form of government.   Many smaller municipalities 
governed by the Selectman form of government begun to add a Town Manager 
position to administer municipal departments. In Connecticut, the three major 
forms of government are in use by municipalities are depicted in the table below.  
Table 1 
Forms of Municipal Government in Connecticut 
Selectman-Town Meeting                                          102 
Selectman-RTM                                                             7 
Mayor-Council                                                             30       
Council-Manager                                                         30       
Total                                                                           169 
CERC, 2005 
Mayor-Council 
The Mayor-Council form of government is utilized in approximately 
thirty municipalities in Connecticut.  It is generally found in small and large 
cities and large towns.  This form of government, with its emphasis on 
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representativeness, consists of one top elected official, the Mayor, with an elected 
legislated body in the form of a Council or Board of Aldermen.  The mayor 
provides policy leadership and executive management, including the hiring and 
firing of department heads. 
Council-Manager 
The Council-Manager form of government arose during the Progressive 
Reform era of the early 1900s to exclude politics and bring greater efficiency to 
local government. It consists of a full-time paid professional referred to as the 
City or Town Manager who is hired by the council to be the chief executive 
officer. In this form of government, the council serves the legislative function and 
appoints a manger who selects department heads and directs their activities.  It is 
the most prevalent form of United States municipal government.  As anticipated 
by Knoke’s (1982) thesis regarding the spatial-temporal diffusion of municipal 
innovations, municipalities in Connecticut that have adopted the council-
manager form of government tend to be clustered around the Hartford area. 
Selectmen-Town Meeting 
While relatively few municipalities in the United States are governed by 
this form of government, the vast majority of municipalities in Connecticut 
utilize a Selectmen-Town Meeting form of government which dates back to the 
colonial era.  In this form of government, the legislative body is the 
representative town meeting.  In a representative town meeting (RTM) where 
voters select a limited number of citizens to represent them at town meetings and 
vote on the budget.  Additionally, the Board of Selectmen is a multi-member 
body ranging in number from three to five members and is responsible for 
executive decision-making.  Day to day authority is given to the First Selectman 
who is the chief executive officer.  This form of government, with its plural 
executive, diffuses authority between the selectmen and the boards and 
commissions that oversee various departments.     
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As Connecticut’s municipalities towns grow and change, they have 
adopted incremental strategies to meet challenges without abandoning the town 
meeting form of government.  The shortcomings of the town meeting form of 
government with its emphasis on representativeness over managerial capabilities 
has prompted many municipalities in New England to hire professional 
managers to perform the day- to-day operations of town government.  Even 
smaller and rural municipalities governed by the Selectmen-Town meeting also 
display an increasing concern to augment their managerial capabilities.  The 
changes have taken a variety of forms such including the creation of a chief 
administrative officer in the form of an administrative assistant, town manager, 
or executive administrator to provide professional support to the Board of 
Selectmen.  In Mayor-Council forms of government the trend towards 
professionalization has taken the form of a chief administrative officer (Hansell 
2002, Svara 2002 and DeSantis and Rennner 2002.     
Municipal Finance in Connecticut: Dynamics and Modalities 
In Connecticut, reliance on local property tax to fund the lion’s share of 
municipal expenditures has placed tremendous pressure on citizens.  Concerns 
about proposed educational finance reform and its implications for municipal 
finance have prompted calls for a property tax cap.  No where is the pressure 
more felt than on municipal chief executives. Municipalities in Connecticut 
display varying levels of fiscal efficiency. Citizens in one locality experience 
routine increases in mill rates while others reside in municipalities that have held 
the line on property taxes. Citizens often question why one municipality with 
similar demographic characteristics manages to contain property taxes while a 
neighboring municipality experiences steady increases.  Accounting for such 
variation will comprise the first portion of the empirical analysis 
Another dimension of financial efficiency is captured by a town’s bond 
rating.  Many towns in Connecticut issue bonds to finance long term capital 
improvements.  A bond rating by one of the rating agencies serves to assess the 
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credit quality of the municipality and determines the rate the issuer will pay on 
the debt.  A municipal bond rating is a relative measure of risk to bondholders as 
well as a measure of financial strength which takes into consideration all of the 
resources of an issuer and the legal structure of the financing.  Connecticut 
municipalities receive their bond rating from Moody’s Investors Service which 
uses economic, debt, administrative and financial performance criteria.   
Hypothesis and Empirical Methodology 
The question of whether a manager form of government is associated with 
better performance than a mayor-council or selectman form of government is an 
empirical one that cannot be unambiguously established, ex ante.  In part, this 
difficulty may reflect the fact that performance can be inherently subjective; it 
may range from the onerous nature of comparatively higher taxes to a gauge of 
arguably inadequate level of services, to difficult-to-quantify intangibles 
reflecting a town’s quality-of-life attributes.   
Given these manifold considerations, a researcher appraising performance 
can opt for one of two approaches.  She can limit the inquiry, remove oneself 
from the semantic constraint and focus on one aspect of performance.  For 
example, an examination limited to financial performance would require largely 
financial variables.  Clearly, the results of such a narrow inquiry are limited in 
their generality; it would be impossible to conclude whether observed 
outstanding financial performance did not benefit from interrelated but possibly 
intangible factors such as attractive cultural events or the presence of many parks 
and recreational activities.   
Alternatively, a researcher can construct a composite metric, drawing on 
increasingly popular data reduction methods such as factor analysis or principal 
components to construct a performance index that would aggregate the 
information content of a town’s financial variables and qualitative elements.  
Although they command their own store of limitations, indices tend to capture 
the broader aspects of what is commonly understood as performance. 
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We use a town’s bond rating as a proxy for performance.  Municipal bond 
ratings are intended to provide investors with a guide to the relative investment 
quality of bond issues and thereby entail a composite measure of the financial 
strength of a township, city, county, schools or special districts.  Municipalities 
issue two types of bonds, for the most part: general obligation bonds and 
revenue bonds.  General obligation bonds are issued to finance a wide variety of 
municipal operations and repayment of debt is from taxation and other general 
revenue sources.  The bonds are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the 
local government issuing the bond.  Revenue bonds are issued to raise funds to 
finance specific projects, for the most part long-term capital projects and public 
improvement projects.   Repayment of revenue bonds is from revenue derived 
from the investment.   
The precise nature of the bond rating process is known only to the 
agencies. Although raters focus primarily on financial variables, they 
systematically take into account all of the resources of the issuer, debt levels and 
debt structure, the legal structure of the financing and also intangibles such as 
leadership quality and management ability.  It is not clear what weight financial 
variables command in the ratings process let alone how the intangible variables 
are quantified and the relevance, or weight, they are given.   
Because it bodes well for someone appraising the likelihood of debt 
repayment, it appears to us that a bond rater is more likely to attach more 
favorable rankings to communities with a comparatively more efficient delivery 
of services, where efficiency is gauged as cost per unit of service delivered.  Thus, 
to the extent that better performance is associated with a less costly provision of 
the services required by a community then increased performance is positively 
associated with favorable bond ratings.  Previous empirical efforts examining the 
relationship between form of government and performance are inconclusive.  
Hayes and Chang (1990) examine expenditures for police, fire and garbage for 
191 cities and find no significant difference in the expenditure levels for these 
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functions between managers and mayor-council cities. Stumm & Corrigan (1998) 
on the other hand, find a clear positive association between the manager form of 
government and several fiscal variables. 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical modeling approach is driven by particular features of the 
variables in the data set.  First, because the dependent variable of interest, 
Moody’s Bond rankings, takes on ten ordered values, we use an estimator for 
ordered outcomes. Ordered regression models produces coefficients that 
represent the effect of each independent variable net of all other included 
independent variables, as well as standard errors associated with these 
coefficients that allow for hypothesis testing.  Ordered regression recognizes the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable without assuming that the differences 
between one (bond) rating and the next are of uniform size across the variable’s 
entire range.  Parameters estimating the effect of independent variables on the 
dependent variable taking on a successively greater value are calculated using 
maximum likelihood techniques (see Winship and Mare 1984; Wooldridge 2000) 
and are readily generated with most commercial statistical software packages. 
The analysis presented was performed using Stata 9.0. 
The second consideration is a sample selection problem.  Table 2 contains 
a tabulation of the various bond ratings in the data set.  Out of the 169 townships 
for which we have data, 18 do not report a bond rating.  This omission may be a 
result of the fact that a non-reporting town has not had any reason to use bond 
financing; its level of services can be adequately met by tax revenues.  
Alternatively, the town may have failed to report a bond rating because the 
particular town may have anticipated not drawing a favorable rating and 
therefore it either did not solicit one or it decided not to issue the bond.  
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Table 2 
Observations per Bond Rating 
Bond 
Rating Frequency Percent Cumm 
A1 41 24.3% 24.3% 
A2 20 11.8% 36.1% 
A3 30 17.8% 53.8% 
Aa1 8 4.7% 58.6% 
Aa2 13 7.7% 66.3% 
Aa3 22 13.0% 79.3% 
Aaa 12 7.1% 86.4% 
Baa1 4 2.4% 88.8% 
Baa3 1 0.6% 89.3% 
NA 18 10.7% 100.0% 
Total 169 100.0%  
Thus, the dependant variable, bond ratings, is not always observed.  We 
must therefore proffer a selection equation that determines whether a town 
makes it into the examination sample.  The equation consists of a binary 
dependent variable set to 1 if a town has issued a bond and 0 if it has not.  An 
examination of variables suggests that most small towns, characterized by 
smaller populations and appropriately less extensive levels of services, are less 
likely to issue bonds. Thus, we propose to identify those towns that do have 
bond ratings by using population as the selection variable.   Linear predictions 
based on the estimated coefficients of the selection model allow us to construct 
the inverse mills ratio, f(Zi)/(1-f(Zi)), the ratio of the normal density and the 
normal cumulative probability function. 
The mill ratio then enters the ordered regression model as an explanatory 
variable.  This two-step treatment ensures that the probability of a bond issue is 
not necessarily established by the same set of variables used to distinguish the 
relationship between a particular form of government and bond rating (Sigelman 
and Lee 1999; Grier, Munger & Roberts 1994). 
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43 
Accordingly, we can specify the empirical model as follows: 
zBi PB* P = β B1B XB1i B + εB1i B  (1) 
rBi PB* P = β B2BXB2i B + µB2iB   (2) 
yBi B = m       if τBm-1 B ≤  yBi PB* P  < τBm B for m = 1 to J 
Equation 1 is the sample selection equation where z Bi PB* P is an unobserved 
variable, the likelihood of a bond issue.  We do not observe this variable but do 
observe an indicator variable zBiB that equals 1 if zBi B > 0 and equals 0 otherwise.   
Equation 2 is an ordinal regression model that represents an underlying latent 
variable, r,* ranging from -∞ to +∞.  The measurement model for ordinal 
outcomes divides r* into J ordinal categories where the thresholds τB1 B through τBJ-1 B 
are estimated. 
Thus, our selection procedure establishes the probability of a bond issues 
based on the size of a towns population using a probit model.  
Prob(Bond Issue) = φ(level of services) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
town reports a bond rating and a 0 otherwise.  We use an ordered probit 
estimator; the inverse mills ratio drawn from the selection process enters the 
ratings equation.  We use data on the reported level of reported township 
expenditures as a proxy for the level of services; the reported expenditures 
variable is entered in logarithms. 
Our ordered probit specification is presented in algebraic terms:  
Performance = 
φ(Manager, Population, mill rate,taxes, Industrial/commercial share of 
grand list ,per capita income, Inverse Mill Ratio) 
Performance is a town’s Moody’s Bond rating.  Our variable of interest is 
Manager, a binary variable accounting for the presence of a manager type of 
government (Manager = 1) versus a non-manager (Manager = 0) type of 
government.  The non-manager type of government – for which the binary 
variable is set to 0 - encompasses various political models typically found in use 
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by Connecticut’s municipalities.  The expected sign depends on the relative 
influence of the various interest groups in a township.  We attempt to control for 
the relative influence of the business and commercial groups, unions and the 
population at large.  Share is a variable that represents a town’s 
Commercial/Industrial share of a township’s grand list; thus we would expect 
this variable to be positively associated with bond ratings.  The variable 
Population represents a township or municipalities’ reported population in 200#.  
The variable Mill rate represents a town’s fiscal burden; specifically the mill rate 
is the property tax valuation multiplier reported rate in 2002.  The variable Taxes 
represents a town’s per capita tax as a percent of state average. Per capita income 
represents a town’s reported income per person and is considered a proxy for the 
wealth of the community.  The Inverse Mill ratio: is the ratio of the normal density 
and the normal cumulative probability function, f(Zi)/(1-f(Zi)), derived from the 
selection equation. 
Data and Data Treatment 
 Data was obtained from data collected on Connecticut municipalities by 
the Connecticut Economic Resource Center (2005).   The bond rating variable 
was converted into an ordinal scale whereby higher ratings are associated with 
higher numbers; this facilitates interpretation.   The variables for population, per 
capita income, per capita expenditures, share, mill rate and taxes were 
transformed into logarithms prior to its use in a regression to minimize 
heteroskedasticity. 
We report the results for the ordered probit model without correcting for 
selectivity bias and the result for the Heckit procedure correcting for selectivity.  
The results of the selectivity model binomial probit can be found in an appendix 
to this paper.  
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Table 3 
Ordered Probit Regression Results 
Dependent Variable:   bond rating 
Independent Variable   
Ordered 
Probit Heckit 
Manager  0.742 0.662 
  (3.15)* (2.23*) 
Mill Rate  -2.67 -2.37 
  (-5.76)** (-5.28*) 
Industrial/Commercial Share 
of Grand List  -0.039 -0.087 
  -0.33 -0.61 
 log tax (as a % of state 
average)  2.923 2.59 
  (7.03*) (7.28*) 
log per capita income  -0.688 -0.139 
  (-5.64)** (-0.76) 
Mills Ratio  4.316  
  (4.03**)  
    
Observations   147 166 
Absolute value of z statistics in parenthesis 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The proposed hypothesis of the manager model is confirmed by the 
ordered probit analysis for the selectivity bias corrected model as well as for the 
uncorrected one. The dummy variable for the manager form of government 
confirms highly statistically significant and positive relationship to Bond ratings.  
There are some inherent caveats about our general conclusion imputed by 
the Heckit procedure.  The success of the sample selection bias procedure 
depends greatly on correctly specifying the selection model.  The selection model 
is relatively parsimonious. 
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Concluding Comments and Future Research 
When the concern is over performance, there are strong arguments in 
support and equally compelling critical counterarguments for both the mayor-
council, and the manager form of government – especially among municipalities 
in Connecticut.  Thus, the resolution of this controversy must clearly be 
empirical.    
We find statistical support showing the manager form of government as 
being positively associated with higher municipal bond ratings and confirm the 
findings of Stumm & Corrigan (1998).  Bond ratings offer a viable aggregate 
measure of not only a town’s ability to service its debt but any number of other 
elements that reflect the presence of efficient mechanisms in the delivery of 
services.   The positive association between a manager form of government and 
higher bond ratings would confirm the hypothesis that managers are better able 
to exert financial control due to their relative freedom from political 
considerations and their primary emphasis on efficiency as a result of their 
professional training and orientation.   
Other possible explanations that require further analysis may be found in 
the form of institutional constraints such as the budget referendum.  In towns 
which utilize a referendum, citizen concerns over taxes may act as a powerful 
check on expenditures.  The relative weight of this factor has yet to be explored 
and may, in combination with professional managerial control, may contribute to 
higher financial performance as measured by bond ratings.  
As we addressed earlier in our paper, performance encompasses multiple 
dimensions.  Although finances are arguably among the most important 
considerations for a municipality, performance can be measured using a variety 
of factors such as education, the depth and breadth of services offered by a 
municipality including leisure and cultural activities.   A future research agenda 
includes analyzing these other dimensions of municipal performance.  
46 
Volume II, Number 2 
Finally, a major question, which is tacitly raised by our findings but lies 
outside the scope of this inquiry, is the issue of municipal reform and innovation.  
Given its apparent superiority in handling municipal finances, why is it the case 
that so few municipalities in Connecticut employ the council-manager form of 
government?  A future research agenda includes an analysis of the dynamics 
underlying municipal reform as well as barriers to change.  We can speculate 
that some possible explanations that militate against municipal reform are the 
strong traditions of local control that are embodied in the selectman and mayor 
forms of government.  In instances where charter revision processes have 
generated proposals to alter the basic form of government and its attendant 
power structure, entrenched interests have often risen up to oppose the adoption 
of a professional manager. 
At every level of government, the heightened concern for performance 
and accountability has prompted a number of managerial innovations designed 
to bring greater efficiency to administration.  The issues raised in this concluding 
section will comprise a future research agenda that examines municipal 
performance in Connecticut with implications for municipalities throughout 
New England.  
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Table 4 
Moody’s Public Finance Ratings 
Rating Long-Term Quality 
Aaa Strongest Creditworthiness 
Aa1/Aa2/Aa3 Strong Creditworthiness 
A1/A2/A3 
Above-average 
Creditworthiness 
Investment 
Grade 
Baa1/Baa2/Baa3 Average Creditworthiness 
Ba1/Ba2/Ba3/B1/B2/B3 
Below Average 
Creditworthiness 
Below 
Investment 
Grade Caa1/Caa2/Caa3 Very Weak Creditworthiness 
source: Moody's Investors Service 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev 
Population 20931 25048 
Household Income 70662 22969.55 
Per Capita Income 10.4 12.3 
Total Expenditures 50900000 67300000 
Total Per Capita 
Expenditures 2369 428.9 
Mill Rate (2002) 28.05 7.09 
Per Capita Tax (as a 
percent of state average) 103.5 33.9 
Commercial/Industrial 
Share of Grand List 
(2001) 11.2 7.29 
SAT Scores 1031.8 79.8 
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Table 6 
Correlation Matrix of Continuous Variables 
 
Variable  Population 
Per 
Capita 
Income 
Total Per 
Capita 
Expenditures 
Mill 
Rate 
(2002) 
Per 
Capita 
Tax (as 
a 
percent 
of state 
average) 
Commercial/Industrial 
Share of Grand List 
(2001) 
SAT 
Scores 
Population 1.00       
Per Capita Income -0.47 1.00      
Total Per Capita 
Expenditures 0.12 0.08 1.00     
Mill Rate (2002) 0.45 -0.16 -0.09 1.00    
Per Capita Tax (as a 
percent of state 
average) -0.14 0.25 0.75 -0.35 1.00   
Commercial/Industrial 
Share of Grand List 
(2001) 0.61 -0.53 -0.08 0.27 -0.26 1.00  
SAT Scores -0.43 0.22 0.17 -0.35 0.39 -0.30 1.00 
 
Table 7 
Results of Probit Selection Model 
 
Dependent: bond issue Coefficient 
Log Expenditures 0.709 
 (4.33)** 
Constant -10.613 
  (3.96)** 
Observations 170 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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